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Abstract—Bitcoin blockchain faces the bitcoin scalability prob-
lem, for which bitcoin’s blocks contain the transactions on the
bitcoin network. The on-chain transaction processing capacity of
the bitcoin network is limited by the average block creation time
of 10 minutes and the block size limit. These jointly constrain
the network’s throughput. The transaction processing capacity
maximum is estimated between 3.3 and 7 transactions per second
(TPS). A Layer2 Network, named Lightning Network, is proposed
and activated solutions to address this problem. LN operates on
top of the bitcoin network as a cache to allow payments to be
affected that are not immediately put on the blockchain. However,
it also brings some drawbacks. In this paper, we observe a specific
payment issue among current LN, which requires additional
claims to blockchain and is time-consuming. We call the issue as
shares issue. Therefore, we propose Rapido to explicitly address
the shares issue. Furthermore, a new smart contract, D-HTLC,
is equipped with Rapido as the payment protocol. We finally
provide a proof of concept implementation and simulation for
both Rapido and LN, in which Rapdio not only mitigates the
shares issue but also mitigates the skewness issue thus is proved
to be more applicable for various transactions than LN.
Index Terms—Blockchain; Lightning Network; Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is firstly issued by a blockchain [1] and the most
widely used valuable decentralized digital currency [2]. How-
ever, it faces a serious issue, i.e., the scalability problem. To
solve this problem, a Layer2 system named Lightning Network
(LN) [3] is introduced, which is an off-chain payment solution
for performing decentralized digital currency payment on top
of a blockchain. Specifically, LN is something like the Virtual
Private Network (VPN) which establishes a virtual peer-to-
peer connection over the Internet. LN theoretically enables fast
and secure mircopayments between participating nodes, which
features an overlay system for making payments through a
network without delegating custody of funds [3]. LN is consti-
tuted of numerous payment channels that allow the two-party
connect by a payment channel securely maintain and update
its own ledger by RSMC (Recoverable Sequence Maturity
Contract) [3]. To leverage the existing payment channels to
perform end-to-end payments, the payment channel network
is introduced. Furthermore, HTLCs (Hashed Timelock Con-
tracts) [3] is designed, which enables a payment acrosses two
or more payment channels with security.
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Fig. 1. An Illustrative Example. The black bold numbers represent the
deposits in each payment channel, which is the initial state of the payment
channel network. For example, 5(2,3) between Alice and Dani represents
that this payment channel has total deposits 5 bitcoins including Alice has 2
bitcoins and Dani has 3 bitcoins, respectively. Suppose that Alice is willing to
pay Bob 6 bitcoins and Alice has and only has the 3 payment channels. One
naive way that Alice needs close the other channels and withdraws the deposits
and then set up a new payment channel to Bob, which is time-consuming and
money-consuming. The blue dash lines represent a simple instance of Rapido
to resolve the shares issue.
Benefiting from LN, any transaction between the two nodes
among LN can be performed and updated rapidly (an payment
takes about 600ms [4]) instead of confirming by blocks (a on-
chain payment should be confirmed by 6 blocks and take about
11 minutes on July 2018 [5]). As the scale of LN is growing,
some limitations have been highlighted, such as sensitive
information leakage issue [4], [6], payments concurrency issue
[4], skewness issue [7], route scalability issue [8], [9] and so
on. Meanwhile, several works have studied on these limitations
[4], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. In addition, similar payment systems
such as credit networks [11], [12] also offer some solutions
for these analogous issues [13], [14], [15].
In LN, we observe a payment issue where a node has
enough deposits to pay another node while there is no pay-
ment channel available to perform this payment. We call
this shares issue, which appears commonly in the current
Layer2 Network. In particular, the shares issue is illustrated
in Fig. 1. Alice is willing to pay Bob 6 bitcoin while Alice
cannot find an available routing path to fulfill this payment.
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One naive solution is that Alice requires to close the three
channels and withdraw all her deposits and then sets up a
new payment channel to Bob to fulfill this payment, where
the close and set up operations must be claimed to the
blockchain for confirming. A node which sets up and closes
a payment channel need pay extra fees [3]. In addition, the
naive solution might also introduce a skewness issue [7] and
payment value privacy issue [4]. Therefore, the shares issue
not only consumes an extra time and consumes an extra money
but also might introduce the other issue such as the skewness
and privacy issues.
In this paper, we propose Rapido to address the shares issue,
which is general and applicable to all payments among the
Layer2 Network. Different from LN, a new routing algorithm
that incents the nodes always online is proposed in Rapido.
Besides, as a transaction is generated, the payment value
can be split into several shares by the Value Distributing
Problem (VDP) program and then respectively distributed to
the other node through these discovered routing paths. With
the VDP program, Rapido not only mitigates the skewness of
nodes but also preserves the privacy of payment value through
splitting the value into shares. In addition, we design D-HTLC
(Distributed-HTLC) to guarantee these payments with security.
The blue dash lines in Fig. 1 represent one instance of Rapido
to resolve the shares issue.
To summarize, the contributions of our paper include the
following.
1) We observe a payment issue, the shares issue, which
might appear in the Layer2 Network and causes time-
consuming and money-costs.
2) We design Rapido to mitigate the shares issue, which
is equipped with D-HTLC and inherently preserves the
privacy of total payment value.
3) We prove that the VDP is NP-hard.
4) The simulation demonstrates that Rapido not only miti-
gates the shares issue but also mitigates the skewness of
nodes.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we demonstrate the necessary background
of our paper including the blockchain and LN.
A. Blockchain
A blockchain is a growing list of records, calls blocks,
which are linked using cryptography [1]. Blockchains which
serve as the public transaction ledger of cryptocurrencies
and are readable by the public of these cryptocurrencies,
such as bitcoin [1] and ethereum [16]. Each block contains
a cryptographic hash of the previous block, a timestamp
and transaction data. By design, a blockchain is resistant to
modification of the data. It is “an open, distributed ledger that
can record transactions between two parties efficiently and
in a verifiable and permanent way”. To use as a distributed
ledger, a blockchain is typically managed by a peer-to-peer
network collectively adhering to a protocol for inter-node
communication and validating new blocks. Once recorded, the
data in any given block cannot be altered retroactively, which
requires a consensus of the network majority.
Bitcoin is a widely used cryptocurrency, a form of electronic
cash [1]. Bitcoins can be paid among the peer-to-peer bitcoin
network directly, without the need for intermediaries, though
most transactions are made through a cryptocurrency exchange
market. Transactions are verified by nodes through cryptogra-
phy and recorded in a public distributed ledger (blockchain).
However, it brings some serious issues, such as the bitcoin
scalability problem. In the real world, the on-chain transaction
processing capacity maximum is estimated 7 TPS, which is
limited by the average block creation time (about 11 minutes)
and the block size limit (1MB) [17].
B. Lightning Network
To mitigate the bitcoin scalability problem, various solutions
are proposed, such as forks (hard fork and soft fork) [18] and
the Layer2 systems (LN [3] and Sprites [8]). fork means the
protocol changes and divides the blockchain into two distinct
entities, which is typically conducted in order to add new
features to a blockchain to reverse the effects of hacking
or catastrophic bugs [18]. Different from fork, the Layer2
Network is implemented on top of the blockchain (most
commonly bitcoin network) as a cache to allow payments to be
performed while does not immediately claim on the blockchain
[3]. LN is a Layer2 Network, which is constituted of a mass
of bi-directional payment channels1 and theoretically enables
fast transactions between participants.
1) Payment Channels: LN, which constitutes of numerous
payment channels, is a technique designed to allow two par-
ticipants to make multiple transactions (e.g., bitcoin) without
committing all of the transactions to the blockchain. Each
payment channel has two parties, who deposit their own bit-
coins and make many secure payments between each other in
exchange for making only a few events (e.g., open a new pay-
ment channel) on the blockchain. Consequently, the payment
channel improves the transaction throughput and eliminates
the transfer fee between the two participants. Furthermore,
Revocable Sequence Maturity Contract (RSMC) [3] must be
leveraged one each payment channel, which guarantees the
transactions’ safety between two-party.
2) Payment Channel Network: A payment channel only
permits secure transfer of funds inside a channel while it can-
not perform a payment between an indirect-linked two-party.
The payment channel network is hence introduced, which is
able to perform a secure payment using a series of payment
channels by Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs) [3]. HTLC
leverages hashlocks and timelocks and can allow payments to
be securely routed across multiple payment channels without
any risk of intermediate nodes stealing the payment in transit.
In a nutshell, suppose that Alice wants to pay Bob 1 bitcoin
through Carol. As an intermediary, Carol earns transfer fees
from this payment. The brief steps are shown in Fig. 2 and
represented as follows.
1For simplicity, in following payment channel of this paper means bi-
directional payment channel.
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Fig. 2. An Example to Elucidate HTLCs. Alice wants to pay Bob through Carol by HTLCs. The icons of locks represent the hashtime lock in different
status. The blue solid line represents that the H is transferred from Bob to Alice by a secure way; the red dash lines represent all participates have HTLCs
and the deposits are locked in payment channels; the green dash lines represent the R is transferred.
1) Bob generates a random number R and calculates its
SHA-256 hash H .
2) Bob gives H to Alice by secure ways (out of the scope
of our paper). Carol will earn 0.1 bitcoin as transfer fees.
3) Alice uses her payment channel to pay Carol 1.1 bitcoin,
but she adds a hashlock that Carol gives her to the 1.1
bitcoin along with an extra condition: in order for Carol to
withdraw the 1.1 bitcoin, she must provide R which was
used to produce H in 2 days2. Carol uses her payment
channel to pay Bob 1 bitcoin, but she also adds a same
hashlock that Bob gives her to the payment along with
an extra condition: in order for Bob to withdraw the 1
bitcoin, she must provide R which was used to produce
H in 1 days.
4) Bob has R which is used to generate H , so Bob can use
it to unlock the hashlock and fully receive the 1 bitcoin
from Carol; Carol also uses the R to unlock the hashlock
from Alice. Finally, Bob receives 1.1 bitcoin from Alice.
In addition, Carol earns 0.1 bitcoin as transfer fees.
3) Routing: In LN, the source should find a routing path
to the destination while a payment is generated. The LN rout-
ing discovering implements a modified version of Dijkstra’s
algorithm to find the shortest path between the them [19]. If
the available routing path is found by the source, it returns a
series of intermediate nodes which encoded the chosen path
from the destination to the source.
III. MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW
In the following, we first describe an example to illustrate
that the payment performed on the LN causes time-consuming
and money-costs. Then, we discuss the motivation of this
paper. Lastly, we propose the overview for Rapido.
A. An Illustrative Example and Motivation
Although LN enables fast payments between participating
nodes and has been touted as a solution to the bitcoin scalabil-
ity problem, drawbacks are also obvious. For example, some
payments might not be performed through LN directly.
2We use days here as in the original description [3]. Instead, the height of
blocks is used for description in the real world.
Fig. 1 describes a simple payment case to elucidate the
above-mentioned drawbacks. Suppose that the simple topology
is a part of LN. Moreover, we suppose that Alice has and
only has 3 routing paths to Bob. However, the naive solution
not only cannot resolve the shares issue but also brings some
issues (privacy, skewness issue, an extra time-consuming and
an extra money-costs) , which has been discussed in Section
I. These issues endows LN with a poor efficiency, which goes
against the original intention of LN.
Some existing works focus on LN [4], [7], [8], such as
a skewed network issue [7] and the payment value’s privacy
issue [4]. For executing a rebalance process, all participants
of rebalance process need to negotiate a better ratio with
each other before a rebalance is proceed. A rebalance process
might be aborted if the negotiation process fails. Moreover,
the participants must be in a loop [7]. Furthermore, REVIVE
cannot resolve the shares issue which is shown in Fig. 1.
For the privacy of payment value, the authors suppose that
all intermediate nodes among a payment path are honest and
then a trust function is revealed to all of them. By this way,
any intermediary of this payment path has the knowledge of
the payment value. However, no one can guarantee that all the
intermediary are honest [4].
We propose an idea to resolve the shares issue by multiple
path payments. As shown in Fig. 1, in an alternative case,
Alice splits 6 bitcoins into 3 shares, such as 1, 2 and 3,
and respectively sends the 3 shares to Bob through Dani,
Carol and Eva, which does not require to close any existing
payment channel or set up a new one. We hereby propose a
new scheme, named Rapido, that a customer can perform a
payment by splitting the payment value into s shares and then
respectively performs the s payments to the merchant. Rapido
can mitigate the above-mentioned issues, such as shares,
skewness, payment value privacy time-consuming and money-
costs issues, and then perform payments more efficiently
among the Layer2 Network.
B. Challenges
To realize Rapido, there are some challenges to be solved..
• How can a customer find available routing paths to the
merchant effectively and efficiently.
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Fig. 3. An Overview of Rapido. A payment is performed from the Rapido
Client 1 to the Rapido Client 2 by D-HTLC among a Layer2 Network.
• How to design a split strategy of payment value for
customers and avoid serious skewness.
• How to design a smart contract to fulfill the payment
effectively and securely.
For the first challenge, we implement a routing discovering
algorithm with a proactive and a reactive part. For the second
challenge, we propose a VDP program. For the third challenge,
we design a new smart contract named D-HTLC, which
enables the customer to perform a payment successfully.
C. Overview and Goals
1) Overview: The overview of Rapdio is shown in Fig. 3.
What is more, simplified steps of a payment from Client 1 to
Client 2 through a Layer2 Network are represented as follows.
Step 1 Through Beacon Election Module, several nodes are
randomly elected as beacons in one period.
Step 2 Each Client finds routing paths to all beacons by the
Proactive Module.
Step 3 The information of routing paths (e.g., the deposits
distribution among the payment channel) is gathered
by Reactive Module of Client 1 when a transaction
from Client 1 to Client 2 is generated.
Step 4 According to the gathered information, Client 1 lever-
ages Value Distributing Module to calculate then select
several available routing paths and splits the payment
value into several shares.
Step 5 The Client 1 distributes these shares to Client 2 by
D-HTLCs among the selected paths, respectively.
2) Goals: Rapido further reaches the following properties.
• High-respond. Rapido mitigates the shares issue and
reaches a high success rate for numerous mircopayments.
• Less-skewed. Rapido mitigates the skewed issue and
the congestion issue, such as a skewed node [7], after
performing lots of payments.
• Privacy. Rapido can preserve payment value privacy,
which is a private issue of customer and merchant.
• Generality. Rather than implementing a solution for
shares issue, Rapido is general and applicable to all
payments among the Layer2 Network.
IV. THE RAPIDO CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we discuss Rapido construction in detail,
which includes 1) Beacons Election, 2) Routing, 3) Value
Distributing, and 4) D-HTLC. Further, the difference between
Rapido and current LN is disscussed in 5) Remark.
A. Beacon Election
In Rapido, each node not only can be a normal status but
also can be beacon status, which can coexist in one node.
Hence, each node has a fixed probability to be elected as a
beacon in Rapido. To elect beacons, the network topology
is split into h ∈ Z+ portions. Then, the nodes in a portion
elect a beacon for this portion. The election follows uniform
distribution and rotates in a period (e.g., 12 hours). By this
way, each node has a chance to be elected as a beacon and
can earn transfer fees, which incents all nodes always online as
well as improve the entire topology and transaction capabilities
of Rapido.
B. Routing in Rapido
Routing path from a customer to a merchant is prerequisite
for a payment to succeed. The routing discovering algorithm
implemented in Rapido includes a proactive part as well as
a reactive part. The proactive part gathers information that is
static or changes slowly, such as payment channels between
nodes, whereas the reactive part mainly focuses on dynamic
information such as the distribution of deposits among pay-
ment channels.
• Proactive Part. Number of nodes in a topology are
randomly elected as beacons for a pre-defined period.
Then, all nodes attempt to find routing paths to all
beacons through Breadth-First-Search (BFS) algorithm.
Detailed information of routing paths to each beacon is
stored in each node’s routing table. The routing paths
information tends to remain unchanged except a new node
joins the Layer2 Network or a new payment channel is
set up. In next period, the election process is executed
once again. The proactive routing process then is executed
repeatedly, and new information is hence stored in each
node instead of the elder one.
• Reactive Part. There are some dynamic information in
the Layer2 Network, such as the distribution of deposits
in each payment channel which consumes lots of com-
puting resources (e.g. CPU) if gathered in real time.
In Rapido, instead of gathering all information in real
time, the customer and the merchant only gather the
dynamic information of each payment channel among
the pre-stored routing paths. Moreover, the customer and
merchant request the dynamic information of the routing
paths to all intermediate nodes. As intermediate nodes,
they response the requests by the reactive part of routing.
Finally, the gathered information is sent back to the
customer. Although the nodes among these routing paths
can response the request from the customer and merchant
by Tor [19], [20], the Tor achieves a low performance,
such as about 5 seconds to complete 50kb data request to
onion sever [21]. This issue will be discussed in V-B2.
C. Value Distributing
The customer gathers the information of the available
routing paths when a transaction is generated, such as the
distribution of deposits on these routing paths. Once infor-
mation gathering process is finished, the customer can split
the payment value into s shares by Linear Program and pay
to the merchant through each routing path, respectively.
In this part, we proceed to formulate the criterion for
congestion that represents the state of a node’s deposit in
a payment channel. Inspired by the congestion factors [22],
[23], we introduce a metric channel congestion factor µij =
Pi/depositij , where Pi represents the ith share is transferred
through Pathi and depositij represents the deposit owns
to the jth intermediate node deposits in (j − 1)th payment
channel over Pathi, i ∈ [1, s] and j ∈ [1, l]. In addition,
a channel congestion factor can predict the skewness of
a node after a payment is performed. According to [22]
and [23], we introduce another metric network congestion
factor µ = maxi∈s,j∈lµij which indicates the bottleneck of
the whole network. For the value distributing issue, it can
be equivalent to the well-known Maximum Flow Problem
[24] iff there are no other restrictions on the routing paths.
Therefore, one can find a solution that minimizes the network
congestion factor in polynomial time through a standard max-
flow algorithm [24]. However, the cumulative transfer fees in
a routing path is one of essential metrics for the customer,
which should be considered in the value distributing process.
For this problem, we aim at minimizing the network con-
gestion factor µ which subjects to a restriction on a transfer
fees according to the chosen paths. It is formulated as follows.
VDP (Value Distributing Problem). Given a Layer2 Net-
work G = (V,E), a source-destination pair (C,M∈ V), each
participant within a transaction sends their transfer fees feev
information and the deposits deposite to C (v ∈ V, e ∈ E).
Besides, a payment has a transfer fee restriction ρ. Finally, we
find a feasible solution to distribute s shares that minimize the
network congestion factor.
Theorem 1: VDP is NP-hard.
Proof 4.1: Consider the following Partition Problem [25].
Given a set A = {α1, α2, · · · , αn}. Moreover, the size of
αi can be represented as S(αi) ∈ Z+. Then, we can find a
subset A′ ⊆ A such that ∑α∈A′ S(α) =∑α∈A−A′ S(α). We
transform the Partition Problem to a simple VDP as follows.
1) Given an element αi ∈ A with size S(αi). In a Layer2
Network, we suppose a transaction between C and theM,
where P would be transferred and the set {A} constitute
all intermediate nodes. We define a transfer fee of node
i as S(αi).
2) Suppose that P is split into two parts (P1 and P2)
for transferring through each routing path, respectively.
Suppose that P1 is transferred from C to M through a
routing path {A′} and P2 is transferred through another
routing path {A − A′}. Besides, we assume that each
channel’s capacity is P/2.
We shall prove that it is possible to transfer P1 and P2
through each routing path, that the total of transfer fees are
not exceed ρ and each payment channel’s channel congestion
factor µ is not exceed to 1 iff there exits a subset A′ ⊆ A and
exits
∑
α∈A′ S(α) =
∑
α∈A−A′ S(α) =
ρ/2.
Note that if variables x1, x2 satisfy x1 ≤ ρ/2 and
x2 ≤ ρ/2, it follows that max (x1 + x2) = ρ and
in addition x1 = x2 = ρ/2. We hence conclude that∑
α∈A′ S(α) ≤ ρ/2 and
∑
α∈A−A′ S(α) ≤ ρ/2, it follows that
max
(∑
α∈A′ S(α) +
∑
α∈A−A′ S(α)
)
= ρ and in addition∑
α∈A′ S(α) =
∑
α∈A−A′ S(α) =
ρ/2. In this issue, P can
be split into two parts as P1 = P/2 and P2 =
P/2 that the
channel congestion factor µ ≤ 1 is not be violated. We hereby
find two part P1 = P2 = P/2 that the total fees restrict to ρ.
The simple VDP hereby can be reduced to a Partition Problem
such that the positive integer S(αi) can be seem as a transfer
fee of the node i.
The Partition Problem is known as strongly NP-hard [25].
We note that the VDP has more restrictions than the simple
VDP such that a payment value P could be split into s ≥ 2
shares and transferred through s routing paths from a customer
to a merchant after a transaction is generated in the Layer2
Network. The VDP hereby can be considered as a k-Partition
Problem [25] which is known as strongly NP-hard [25].
Consequently, the VDP is NP-hard.
Owing to the VDP is NP-hard without polynomial time
algorithm. To resolve VDP, it should be relaxed to a non-
integer linear programming to obtain a approximate solution.
The first step towards obtaining a solution to Problem VDP
is to define it as a linear programming. To that end, we need
some additional notations.
Program VDP:
minimize µ (1)
s.t.
∑
e∈Out(v)
fλe −
∑
e∈In(v)
fλ−Feeve = 0 (2)∑
e∈Out(C)
fλe −
∑
e∈In(C)
fλe = 0 (3)∑
e∈Out(M)
fλe −
∑
e∈In(M)
fλe = 0 (4)∑
v∈R
Feev ≤ ρ (5)
P = P1 + · · ·+ Ps (6)
Pi < depositij (7)
µij ≥ µthreshold (8)
fλe ≥ 0 (9)
µ ≥ 0 (10)
Recall that we are given a network G = (V,E), |V| = N
and |E| = M , source-destination pair C,M ∈ V, a payment
is performed P between C and M and go through R ∈ N
nodes, a transfer fee Feev > 0 for each node v ∈ V, and
a node’s deposit in its former channel (i.e., the jth node’s
deposit of the (j − 1)th channel in Pathi) depositij for each
payment channel e ∈ E, total of transfer fees restriction ρ for
a payment. Let µ be the network congestion factor. Denote
by fλe the flow along e = (u, v) ∈ E that has been routed
from C to u through paths with a total fees λ. Finally, for
each v ∈ V, denote by Out(v) the set of channels that out
from v, and by In(v) the set of channels that input node v. To
mitigate a congestion issue and skewed node issue, a payment
is performed iff µij ≥ µthreshold where µthreshold is pre-
defined. Therefore, the VDP can be formulated as a linear
program, as specified in Program VDP.
The objective function of Program VDP minimizes the
network congestion factor µ. The constraint equations (2), (3)
and (4) denote that the conservation constraint of the payments
and transfer fees through each node. Equation(2) states that
the cumulative fees of a payment out of node v has to be
equal to the cumulative fees before this payment inputs node
v and the transfer fees for node v. For the equations(2) and
(3), any payment from a C to a M, in which the transfer
fees do not need to pay a C or a M. The inequation (5)
states that the constraint of a payment’s total of transfer fees.
Equation(6) states that the sum of the shares must be equal
to the payment value. For the inequation (7), the deposits in
the (j − 1)th payment channel owns to the jth node which
is in the Pathi must larger than the ith share. To mitigate
the skewness and congestion issue, the inequation (8) states
that the payment channel congestion µij must be not less than
a pre-defined threshold µthreshold. Finally, the inequation (9)
and (10) restrict the variables to be nonnegative.
According to the result of Program VDP, the customer can
splits the payment value into shares. However, there might
exist some intermediate nodes disapprove of this payments.
Therefore, we introduce a request mechanism which is
executed before distributing these shares. In request mech-
anism, the customer proposes a proposal and requests each
node among these selected routing paths such that, whether
participating this payment as an intermediate node. The cus-
tomer is going to perform this payment iff each node agrees
this proposal with the customer. Otherwise, the customer
aborts these selected routing paths and reduplicate the Routing
process. The request mechanism can mitigate some extra
costs that an intermediate node might abort his share payment
when a payment is performing.
D. D-HTLC
D-HTLC is a smart contract which is based on HTLC [3]. In
D-HTLC, we introduce a punish mechanism to avoid some
traps.For example, nodes on routing paths might maliciously
abort before payment, resulting in the reset of D-HTLC and,
unavoidably, the waste of extra costs. To solve this problem,
we lock a certain amount of cash for each node until a D-
HTLC is set up for this payment.
1) Notation: Input a network G = (V,E), suppose
that a customer C ∈ V attempts to transfer P coins
to a merchant M ∈ V. Then, P has been spilt into
s shares listPshare = {P1, · · · , Pi, · · · , Ps} by Program
VDP, that each share has its own routing path listPath =
{Path1, · · · , Pathi, · · · , Paths} toM, such as the ith share
Pi is paid to M through pathi. For each routing path, C
generates a Hi =SHA-256(Ri). Besides, the nodeij means
that the jth node is on pathi. The D-HTLC IDij is deployed
between nodeij and nodei(j+1), which is composed of sender
nodeij , receiver nodei(j+1), the ith value Pi, transfer fee
feeij , hashlock hLki and timelock tLkj . In addition, nodeij
should prepare a cashij according its own transfer feeij (base
fee and fee rate). We represent listCash as the list of all
cashs.
2) Definition of Operations: D-HTLC has 6 main
operations: openPunish, newContract, getBack,
withdraw, refund and punish. We briefly describe
these operations as follows.
• openPunish(C, listNode, listCash) . When a client C
attempts to initialize a payment, the openPunish is
called. Nodes that responses request from C are listed
in listNode. This function is responsible for locking
a certain amount of cash which are listed in listCash
from every involved nodes. It returns 1 iff all nodes in
listNode have locked the corresponding amount of cash;
otherwise, it returns 0.
• newContract
(
IDi(j−1), nodeij , feeij , hLki, tLkij
)
.
This operation constructs a new D-HTLC from from the
nodeij to the nodei(j+1). It returns IDij ; otherwise,
it returns 0. Note that sequence between several
newContracts should be consist with the sequence of
nodes on the path.
• getBack(nodeij , cashij) . This operation is called
when nodeij is trying to retrieve its locked cashij after
newContract succeeds and IDij is returned.
• withdraw(IDij , Ri) . This operation is called when
nodei(j+1) attempts to withdraw Pi from the previous
nodeij within IDij . It succeeds iff nodei(j+1) is able to
reveal the correct Ri to nodeij .
• refund(IDij , Pi) . If there was no withdraw until
tLkij is expired, refund is called to refund Pi to
nodeij .
• punish(C, nodeij , cashij) . As previously mentioned,
we have a punish mechanism to penalize dishonest nodes.
Thus, this punish function is called once a new D-HTLC
aborts because of nodeij , then C would get cashij . For
the latter nodes, the remaining locked cashs are unlocked.
E. Remark
We design a Layer2 system, Rapido, which is different
from the current LN. At the first, we design a new routing
discovering algorithm for Rapido, which incents nodes always
online. Secondly, Rapido splits the payment value into several
shares and distributes these shares to a node by D-HTLC.
Thirdly, D-HTLC is designed based on HTLC while D-HTLC
inherently preserves the privacy of payment value.
V. SYSTEM DISCUSSION
In this part, we discuss the scenario where Rapido can be
used as well as its limitations..
A. Usability
1) Context: Employing the Layer2 Network makes trans-
actions more rapid and convenient than the transactions are
performed on-chain. As summarized in the above discussion,
LN has some issues while Rapido can mitigate them. In
particular, for the shares issue, the naive solution introduces
an extra time and money costs whereas Rapido can eliminate
these costs, which is not require to claim in blockchain.
Different from HTLC, a payment is performed by D-HTLC
should be split into several shares and distributed to the
merchant through selected routing paths. In other words, a
payment is performed by D-HTLC requires more participants.
According to the statics of LN from [26], 2681 nodes that each
node has 8 payment channels on average. Hence, the condition
provides a suitable context for Rapido. Moreover, the Layer2
Network such that LN’s scale is increasing from its birth to
the present. The Layer2 Network with its growth, the future
context is also suitable for Rapido.
2) Scalability: With the scale expansion of the Layer2 Net-
work, more and more nodes and channels would be generated.
For the proactive part of routing, it is O (n). Moreover, the
beacon election is only executed once in each period, which
is not always consumed computing resource. Moreover, the
pre-defined period of election is not short. In reactive part,
for performing a payment, the customer calculates and selects
available routing paths through several beacons and then pay
the split payment shares to the merchant. Considering the
number of beacons is always much less than the total number
of nodes, the process of routing path selection is rapid unless
the number of beacons grows clipping.
B. Security Analysis
1) Threat Model: We suppose that an adversary would be
willing to intercept some information from a transaction be-
tween a customer and a merchant among the Layer2 Network.
A transaction over the Layer2 Network might go through
serval intermediate nodes, whereas security flaws of some
nodes can be found and may be leveraged by an adversary.
Therefore, a payment value can be intercepted if one of
intermediate nodes is compromised. An adversary in our paper
targets the privacy of payment value, which is crucial as the
other security issues (e.g., anonymity of customer/merchant)
when a payment is performing on the Layer2 Network.
2) Guarantees for privacy: Under the previous LN dis-
cussion and adversarial assumption, an adversary can easily
intercept the payment value if one of intermediate nodes
is compromised. In Rapido, the adversary cannot intercept
the total payment value unless it at least compromises one
intermediate node on each routing path. This is because the
payment value is split into several shares and distributed
to the merchant through numerous paths by the customer
while the adversary can only intercept a part of payment
value. Moreover, a payment based on D-HTLC includes more
routing paths as improving difficulty level to compromise all
intermediate nodes. Hence, it is difficult that an adversary
could intercept a complete information of payment value. In
addition, the Rapido also could confuse the adversary, which
only leaks a part of information. Rather than Fulgor and
Rayo [4], Rapido need not introduce an extra trust function to
preserve the privacy of payment value and make a assumption
that all participates are honest.
In addition, any node can requests information of payment
channel to perform the payment in reactive part. Although the
privacy of information can be transmitted and protected by
optional Tor [19], [20], it achieves a low performance [19],
[21]. We note that it might cause some information leakage in
Rapido, if the Tor is turnoff. Considering that lots of nodes are
elected as beacons, there are a majority of nodes would be as
intermediate nodes when a payment is performed. Moreover,
lots of payments might be generated on the Layer2 Network
in a short time. Therefore, the information, e.g., the node’s
deposits on each payment channel, is rapidly changing and
out date quickly. Consequently, Rpaido theoretically enables
information leakage with a low probability.
VI. SIMULATION
In this section, we present extensive experiments to evaluate
Rapido. To be more convincing, we provide a working proof
of concept (POC) implemented in Python with a real dataset
of LN.
A. Dataset and Setup
The experiments were conducted on machines with Intel i7
8700K and 32GB RAM. For simulating a Layer2 Network,
we crawled a dataset with 2, 681 nodes and 7, 347 payment
channels from LN of Recksplorer [26] on July 2018. Besides,
detailed information of each node and payment channel are
also demonstrated, such as capacity, base transfer fee, rate of
transfer fee and so on. In common, the 20% people always
own 80% of all wealth [27], which also can be analogous
to LN. Based on the fact that there usually exits some super
“huge” nodes which owns lots of payment channels (60+)
and thus deposits (e.g., “tady je slushovo” [26]), we assume
that the distribution of deposits on each channel follows the
Pareto distribution [27]. Under this assumption, we suppose
that two nodes among a payment channel, where the node who
own more channels has 80% deposits. We simulate a simple
blockchain by golang, which has links open on our Layer2
Network. Based on these statics, assumptions and setup, we
derive datasets for our simulation which are represented as
following.
B. Beacon Election and Average Routing Hops
In our work, the routing algorithm includes proactive part
and reactive part. In proactive part, some beacons are elected,
and then each node finds a routing path to each beacon. The
left half of Fig. 4 represents that the average hops between
any two nodes among the Layer2 network topology. The label
of X-axis (5, 50, 200 and 500) represents numbers of beacon
nodes. We can find that the 5, 50, 200 and 500 labeled bars
are of about the same height, with the average hops of about
5.1. However, the more beacons are elected, the more routing
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Fig. 4. Average hops statics between any two nodes, which is simulated on
Rapdio and LN, respectively.
information should be stored in routing table each node. To
avoid routing table overhead and meanwhile incent more nodes
to be online, we empirically elect 200 beacons in topology.
On the other hand, the right half of Fig. 4 represents the
routing algorithm of current LN. We notice that the average
hops between any two nodes of current LN is about 3.6, which
is less compared with our approach. This stems from that
the route discovering algorithm of current LN does not need
go through any beacons. Under some circumstances, a shares
issue might appear, which cannot be fulfilled by current LN
whereas it might be fulfilled by Rapido. In addition, each node
has a chance to be elected as a beacon, which makes all nodes
possible to earn transfer fees and thus incents them to be online
more often. Furthermore, Rapido can preserve the privacy of
payment value without any trust function. Under estimating a
transfer fee, the customer extra pays about 10 Satoshis (sato)3
fees to a node in general when a value of 1, 000 satos payment
goes through a node, which is extremely small. Therefore, the
quantitative difference of average hops is acceptable.
C. Transaction Scenarios
1) Scenario 1: We investigate the success rate of micro-
payments on LN and Rapido respectively through simulation.
According to the above mentioned statics and assumptions,
a series of micropayments are generated between randomly
selected customer-merchant pairs (the selected customer owns
enough deposits in all his payment channels to perform the
payments). Considering that in a LN with 2, 681 nodes [26],
the probability of concurrent payment is pretty low, thus
we does not take concurrent payments into account in our
simulation.
Fig. 5 shows average transfer fees under different payment
value (we empirically choose 10, 000, 25, 000, 50, 000 and
100, 000 satos according to the nature of micropyment) and
different systems (yellow and green bars denote for Rapido,
blue ones denote for LN). We attribute large error bars to the
randomness of nodes selection strategy, in which the routing
paths between selected nodes vary a lot. More than one group
of fee restrictions were set for Rapido, and the results showed
that adaptive restrictions (30, 60, 80, 100) can achieve a lower
31 bitcoin = 1× 108 Satoshis, 1 Satoshi ≈ 8× 10−5$ [5].
Rapido-feeRestriction(200,200,200,200)
Rapido-feeRestriction(30,60,80,100)
Lightning Network
Av
er
ag
e 
Tr
an
sf
er
 F
ee
s(
Sa
to
sh
i)
0
50
100
150
200
250
Payment Value (Satoshi)
10000 25000 50000 100000
Fig. 5. The average and standard deviation of transfer fees based on Rapdio
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Fig. 6. The success rate of payments which are based on Rapdio and LN,
respectively.
average transfer fee compared with the fixed one (200, 200,
200, 200), and achieves almost the same average transfer fee
with which in LN. Fig. 6 shows the corresponding success
rate. With similar transfer fees, Rapido always achieves a high
success rate than LN. For LN, the customer require to find the
available shortest routing path when a transaction is generated.
Additionally, there is no guarantee that an available routing
path should exit for a payment. For Rapido, benefiting from
the VDP program, the payment value by Rapido can be split
into shares and pay to the merchant respectively.
Furthermore, we note that Rapido can achieve a higher
success rate if the restriction of transfer fee is relaxed (as
the yellow bars in histogram compared with the green ones).
However, we observe that 100% success rate is not achieved,
due to the fact that once all nodes attempt to connect with
all beacons, then the beacons might not enough deposits
to perform the payment. In addition, combined with Fig.
5, we can note that not large transfer fee increment (about
10 ∼ 160 satos 8×10−4 ∼ 1.28×10−2$) could bring a large
improvement on success rate. Therefore, to achieve a higher
success rate, the transfer fee restriction can be relaxed.
2) Scenario 2: In this scenario, we randomly select 20
customer-merchant pairs, each of which independently gener-
ates payments of 10, 000, 25, 000, 50, 000 and 100, 000 satos
respectively for 15 times. Note that the payments can only
be initiated by customers and then received by merchants. In
addition, we assume that the selected customers has enough
deposits to fulfill the payments. Under this assumption, both
0.0045
0.013
0.019 0.015
0.037 0.036 0.041
0.068
Rapido-feeRestriction(30,60,80,100)
Lightning Network
Ra
ti
o 
of
 S
er
io
us
 S
ke
we
d 
No
de
s
0
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
Payment Value (Satoshi)
10000 25000 50000 100000
Fig. 7. The ratio of serious skewed nodes based on Rapdio and LN,
respectively.
customers and merchants should be huge nodes which both
have 60+ payment channels
To better describe a skewed node, we introduce a skewness
metric to denote the skewness of a node in a certain direction.
Concretely, a payment of value z attempts to go through a
node with an input channel and an output channel that the
deposit named Zin and Zout respectively. Thus the skewness
on the direction from input to output is Zout/Zin. Since the
node earns a transfer fee of Fee, skewness then becomes
(Zout − z)/(Zin + z + Fee) until the payment is done. Ap-
parently, if several payments with large value goes through
this node, its skewness could decrease badly, which means
that the node tends to be “very skewed”. In this paper, we call
a node is seriously skewed if its skewness is less than 0.01.
Furthermore, if there are n nodes seriously skewed among all
m nodes which involved in a payment, we say that the ratio
of serious skewed is n/m.
Fig. 7 shows the ratio of serious skewed node after 15
rounds of above mentioned payments from customers to
merchants. We find out that there exit skewed nodes even
when both sides of payments are huge nodes, and the ratio of
seriously skewed nodes tends to be higher in LN than in our
Rapido implementation. Our experiment proves that Rapido is
capable of mitigating the skewness of nodes and congestion
after several payments.
VII. RELATED WORK
There are some limitations on LN and some prior research
works have studied on them. Most of the works mainly
focus on customer/merchant anonymity. Heilman proposed
TumbleBit which allows parties to make fast, anonymous,
off-blockchain payments through an untrusted intermediary
called the Tumbler [10]. Green and Miers represented Bolt that
allows for secure, instantaneous and private payments that sub-
stantially reduce the storage burden on the LN [6]. Malavolta
et al. proposed Fulgor and Rayo [4] that Fulgor and Rayo are
payment protocols for LN that can protect the balance secu-
rity, payment value privacy and customer/merchant anonymity
based on a trust function. Fulgor is a blocking protocol and
therefore prone to deadlocks of concurrent payments, whereas
Rayo is a protocol that enforces non-blocking progress (i.e., at
least one of the concurrent payments terminates). In addition,
some research works studied on the applicability of LN such
that a skewed LN might be generated after multiple transac-
tions. Khalil and Gervais proposed REVIVE that allows an
arbitrary set of user in LN to rebalance their nodes, according
to the preferences of the nodes [7]. REVIVE can only be
leveraged to solve a skewed loop network, in which might
cause an increased collateral cost on payment routing path.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The idea of the Layer2 Network is proposed to resolve the
bitcoin scalability problem, which theoretically enables fast
transactions between participates. However, there exists some
drawbacks. In this paper, we obeserve a new issue, shares
issue, which might bring some unnecessary costs. To mitigate
shares issue, we propose Rapido which is equipped with D-
HTLC. Furthermore, Rapido also mitigates the skewness issue.
In addition, Rapido inherently preserves the privacy of total
payment value, for which the payment value is split into
shares that an intermediate node cannot intercept the whole
information. We have conducted extensive experiments to
evaluate Rapido, which demonstrate that the proposed system
outperforms the state-of-the-arts.
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